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INTRODUCTION
Allocations for consumptive use of Chattahoochee
River waters have led to a myriad of legal issues. Federal
and state statutes and case law are conflicitng.
Complicating the matter are political considerations
among the three states involved. The need for
identification of the issues has been stimulated by the
Corps of Engineers' proposal to divert a portion of the
Buford project waters from non-consumptive use in
hydropower generation to consumptive use as municipal
water supply. The implementation of this proposal will
arguably have a significant impact on downstream users.
Three questions evolve from the proposal. First, is there
an ascertainable limit to consumptive use of
Chattahoochee waters and is that limit being approached?
Second, what political entities have the power, or the
right, to allocate consumptive use of the Chattahoochee
River waters? Finally, what are the mechanisms for such
allocation and which mechanism will provide equitable
allocation amongst the various users? This paper
concel1:trates on answering the last two questions.
FEDERAL ALLOCATION
The U.S. Congress has exerted federal authority over
the Chattahoochee River. Beginning in 1945, Congress
authorized development of the river for navigation, flood
control and hydropower purposes. Congress authorized,
or at least acquiesced to, providing water supply to
Atlanta, Georgia when it authorized the Buford project in
1945. The Dam was substantially' completed in 1957. In
1972 Congress funded a study of an effective means of
future water supply for Atlanta, resulting in the 1988
Corps reallocation proposal that is the focus of the
present dispute.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has proposed a
Chattahoochee River water allocation policy that is at the
heart of the current controversy. The Corps itself,
however, does not have the power to direct the proposed
allocation. Rather it is responding to U.S. Congressional
statutes which permit the changes to authorized project
purposes of existing federal projects to include municipal
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water supply (and other) purposes. The statute clearly
indicates that such reallocation will occur only in
"cooperation with States and local interests" and only •
when the federal project purposes are not "seriously
affected." The Corps may reallocate a certain amount of
total storage capacity to water supply purposes without
further approval by Congress, but the Corps proposal for
the Chattahoochee exceeds that amount. Significantly, the
wording of this Statute suggests that Congress intended to
leave general responsibility and authority of consumptive
water allocation to the states themselves. This is in
keeping with Congress' traditional deference to state water
law.
Deference to state water law does not mean however
that Congress has no Constitutional power to allocate
such waters, especially state waters that can be considered
navigable. Clearly the U.S. Congress has the power to
regulate the allocation of navigable waters such as the
Chattahoochee. The only question concerns the extent of
that power.
The right of the Federal Government to regulate
matters between states usually arises under in Article I, §8
of the Constitution. This article specifically provides the
U.S. Congress with power "to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Known as the "Commerce Clause,"
this section provides extensive power to the Federal
Government to regulate matters involving the states, both
individually and collectively. It has formed the basis for
most of the Federal power to manage and regulate water
resources.
Early in the Country's history, navigable waters were
identified as an integral part of interstate commerce. By
1899, the U.S. Supreme Court had defined Congress'
power over navigable waters noting that the Federal
Government had "the right to take all needed measures to
preserve the navigability of the navigable water courses of
the country even against state action." [U.S. v. Rio
Grande D&I Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899)] At the very least,
this ruling establishes the power of the Federal
Government to restrain state withdrawal which affects the
navigability of a water course. In 1940, the Court
expanded this power when it stated that "it cannot
properly be said that the constitutional power of the
United States over its waters is limited to control for
navigation ... In truth the authority of the United States
is the regulation of commerce on its waters ... The point
is that navigable waters are subject to national planning
and control in the broad regulation of commerce granted
to the Federal Government." [U .S. v. Appalachian EPC,
311 U.S. 377 (1940)]
This ruling can be clearly interpreted as authorizing
the Federal Government to do more than simply restrain
state water allocation that interferes with navigability.
Rather the ruling can be interpreted as empowering the
Federal Government to actively establish and direct the
"when and where" of water allocation. As indicated by the
Supreme Court, these rulings apply throughout the
country regardless of the underlying theory of state water
law and are not restricted only to areas of water scarcity.
In areas of water scarcity, the Court has extended the
rule even farther. It has identified water, specifically
groundwater, as an article of interstate commerce and, as
such, subject to the same extensive regulation as any other
item of interstate commerce. [Sporhase v Nebraska, 458
U.S. 941 (1982)] This expansive definition has not been
applied to surface waters. However, it is not a major
extension of the concept to include surface waters such as
the. Chattahoocheee River when the "safe yield" of the
River is being approached and comprehensive regional
water resources management is required.
Two factors inhibit implementation of the proposal in
the near future however. The first restraint concerns the
fact that the competing state political 'and economic
interests make Congressional authorization difficult. A
second limitation exists with poss~ble competing federal
interests involved in the allocation. The Corps and the
Department of Energy apparently take contrary views
regarding the economic impact of the proposal on
hydropower generation. Another impediment is the delay
that may develop as the result of the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
NEPA requires that federal agencies include
environmental damage assessment in the decision-making
process. When any major Federal action is proposed, the
sponsoring agency must analyze the effect of the proposal
on the environment and balance the benefits of the
proposed action against any adverse effects. The agency
must provide a report on its analysis and conclusion. In
accordance with NEPA requirements the Corps has. made
the assessment of the environmental impact of its proposal
and published its "Finding of No Significant Impact"
(FONSI) with its draft proposal. This FONSI is subject
to challenge by forces opposing the proposal however. Its
appears the environmental analysis may have been limited
to the various purposes authorized by Congress for
projects in the ACF. It may be claimed that the Corps
has failed to consider the impact of (possibly) reduced
water supply to municipalities and industries downstream
of Atlanta. The downstream users may bring an action in
federal court, claiming the Corps has not met the NEPA
requirements. While the courts cannot alter the
substantive findings of the Corps analysis, it can require
the Corps to make more detailed study of the environ-
mental effects of the proposal. This could further delay
the implementation of the proposal, perhaps for years.
The Atlanta Regional Commission has indicated that
time is of the essence and that, if the water supply is not
made available soon, Atlanta growth will be inhibited.
From Atlanta's perspective it may be preferable to develop
other alternatives to the Corps proposal to ensure
adequate water supply is obtained in an expeditious
manner.
STATE ALLOCATION
Traditionally, water allocation has been controlled by
the water laws of the state jurisdiction through which the
water course ran. Most disputes involve diversions by
upstream users that allegedly harm downstream users and
a significant body of law has developed addressing this
issue. In a riparian water law jurisdiction such as
Alabama, the rule is usually based on the "reasonable use"
of water by the upstream user. In jurisdictions such as
Georgia and Florida, large withdrawals are controlled by
the state; and upstream-downstream controversies may be
regulated soley according to the state's best interest.
Since political boundaries generally do not follow
watershed boundaries, however, conflicts arise that cannot
be solved by applying specific state water laws; and the
states must settle their differences through interstate
agreement.
Article 1, §10 of the U.S. Constitution establishes the
framework for interstate agreement on water allocation.
Section 10.establishes the right of states to enter into
agreements, or compacts, with each other to resolve
disputes. Normally such an agreement must be ratified by
the U.S. Congress, establishing the Compact as federal
law. The Compact can therefore preempt state law.
Thus Florida and Georgia can agree on an allocation
scheme acceptable to both states. Once the compact
has been established, the states may not arbitrarily
withdraw from it and all state citizens are bound by the
compact. As federal law, the Compact is immune to most
legal challenges, to include a challenge that it interferes
with interstate commerce.
Allocation of the Chattahoochee River waters between
Alabama and Georgia is complicated because of the
location of the border between the states and the issue of
who owns and controls the water. When Georgia ceded
its western portions beyond the Chattahoochee to the
United States, before Alabama became a state, the
Georgia border was established as the western bank of
the Chattahoochee. This border issue has been upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court. [Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S.
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381 (1851); Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. 505 (1859)] As
a consequence, Georgia maintains that the waters of the
Chattahoochee belong to Georgia exclusively to the
Florida line. The Georgia view appears to be that
withdrawal of water from the Chattahoochee by Alabama
users must conform to the laws of Georgia and that
Chattahoochee water withdrawal is solely within the
Georgia state authority. Some support for this view does
exist in the case lawo However, a contrary view can be
argued since a navigable waterway is involved and the
Supreme Court holds that conflicting rights of states
cannot be resolved under state law.
The attraction of a state Compact is that the states can
directly influence water allocation and that the Compact
can establish a truly efficient regional resource
management scheme to maximize beneficial use of the
water. The Compact mechanism can do this without the
constraints of cumbersome federal restrictions.
JUDICIAL ALLOCATION
If neither of the above mechanisms are effective, the
interstate conflict may be resolved in court. Bypassing
both the Executive and Congressional branches, any state
in the Union can bring an interstate conflict directly to
the U.S. Supreme Court for resolution. The Court has
traditionally applied the doctrine of "Equitable
Apportionment" to interstate water disputes. This
doctrine is based on the proposition that equality of right
does not mean equality of apportionment. Rather, the
basis for apportionment is similar to the concept of
"reasonable efficient use of water." [Colorado Vo New
Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982)] The Court weighs the harm
and benefits to competing states but recognizes "that the
equities supporting the protection of existing economies
will usually be compelling." That is not to say however
that future use in one state may not justify impact on an
existing use in another state. Reasonable use would
include reasonable conservation measures to prevent
waste.
The Court's judgement settles the ·issue unless
Congress intervenes and passes a law to resolve the
conflict. The Supreme Court does not favor hearing
such a suit, however, preferring that states enter into some
sort of agreement or Compact. However, judicial
allocation does not appear to be a viable resolution
of the controversy from either Alabama's or Florida's
perspective. Georgia's present economic use of the
Chattahoochee River arguably lays claim to "better use."
CONCLUSIONS
A review of the legal issues in the Chattahoochee
River water allocation controversy reveals that several
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mechanisms exist to establish a consumptive water
allocation scheme The review reveals current and
potentially significant water resources concerns that
demand regional planning. Until now, the seeming
abundance of water in the southeast allowed for
segmented water use. The present allocation dispute over
the Chattahoochee has highlighted the limitations of the
existing Chattahoochee River basin and demonstrates that,
as in the West, basin-wide planning considering all present
and future interests is necessary.
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